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Congress created the U nonimmigrant status to assist noncitizen vic-
tims of serious crime and to encourage them to assist law enforce-
ment in the investigation of that crime. Despite these laudable goals, 
the process has been flawed since the outset. U visas were capped at 
10,000 per year, eventually precipitating a multi-year backlog that 
diminishes the incentive to report crime for persons who fear depor-
tation. Of particular importance, the willingness of law enforcement 
officers to provide a certification of helpfulness—a mandatory com-
ponent of an application for U status—varies tremendously across 
agencies. Eligibility for U status is thus a matter of “geographic rou-
lette.” New policies implemented under the Trump Administration 
threaten this already fraught scheme. In particular, the Department 
of Homeland Security has reinvigorated cooperative enforcement 
agreements with state and local police and expanded removal priori-
ties to include those merely charged or suspected of criminal activity. 
These developments mean that undocumented victims of serious 
crime expose themselves to significant risk of deportation when they 
involve the police. When crime is unreported, perpetrators may re-
main at large, free to offend again. Particularly in domestic violence 
situations, survivors and their families remain vulnerable to further 
harm. Ironically, these results conflict with another stated initiative 
of the Trump Administration: fighting crime. This symposium essay 
offers five concrete reforms that would ameliorate the problems 
hampering the effectiveness of the U visa. 
INTRODUCTION 
Yanet fled to the United States from an abusive husband in El Salvador.1 
When she sought legal help, her lawyer tried to force her to perform oral 
sex. She reported him to the police but is now afraid to move ahead with the 
charges, or seek a visa for crime survivors who assist police, for fear of de-
portation. Cristina withstood physical violence from her husband for years; 
                                               
1 Jennifer Medina, Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear: Deportation., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/immigrants-deportation-sexual-abuse.html. 
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only when she began to fear for her children’s safety did she file a police 
report.2 She too has abandoned the matter despite a potential pathway to 
lawful status out of concern that federal immigration authorities will seek to 
deport instead of assist her. Wilson called 911 after seeing a trespasser on 
his property, following a series of attempted break-ins to his home and car. 
When police arrived, they apprehended not only the trespasser, but also 
Wilson, and drove him to a Seattle Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) field office within an hour of the initial call.3 
Many similar stories have made news headlines since the inauguration of 
President Donald Trump.4 Throughout the country there is evidence of “a 
sharp downturn in reports of sexual assault and domestic violence among 
Latinos,” and law enforcement officials in cities such as Los Angeles, Hou-
ston, and Denver have argued that the national turn toward harsher immi-
gration policy and rhetoric has made noncitizens less willing to work with 
police.5 
Undocumented victims of crime are uniquely caught between two signif-
icant law enforcement priorities: the reduction of criminal activity and the 
enforcement of immigration laws. To address this tension, Congress created 
the U visa in 2000 to protect survivors of certain crimes who have the cour-
age to come forward, report the incident, and assist in any criminal investi-
gation or prosecution.6 The dual purposes of the legislation were to enhance 
                                               
2 Id. 
3 Paul P. Murphy & Deanna Hackney, Police answered immigrant’s call for help, then gave him to ICE, 
CNN (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/13/us/tukwila-police-ice-detain-trnd/index.html 
(discussing how although Wilson Rodriguez had no criminal record and was a Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals-recipient, the officers acted on the basis of an immigration administrative warrant 
issued after he missed his immigration court date in 2004). 
4 See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, Hispanics ‘Are Going Further into the Shadows’ Amid Chilling Immigration 
Debate, Police Say, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/05/12/immigration-debate-might-be-having-a-chilling-effect-on-crime-reporting-in-
hispanic-communities-police-say/?utm_term=.891778ad1523; Nora Caplan-Bricker, “I Wish I’d Never 
Called the Police,” SLATE (Mar. 19, 2017), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2017/03/u_visas_gave_a_safe_path_to_cit
izenship_to_victims_of_abuse_under_trump.html; Katie Mettler, ‘This is Really Unprecedented’: ICE 
Detains Woman Seeking Domestic Abuse Protection at Texas Courthouse, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/16/this-is-really-unprecedented-ice-
detains-woman-seeking-domestic-abuse-protection-at-texas-courthouse/?utm_term=.3b1f700944e6; 
James Queally, Latinos Are Reporting Fewer Sexual Assaults Amid a Climate of Fear in Immigrant 
Communities, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
immigrant-crime-reporting-drops-20170321-story.html; Maya Rhodan, Deportation Fears Silence Some 
Domestic Violence Victims, TIME (May 30, 2017), http://time.com/4798422/domestic-violence-
deportation-immigration/; John Burnett, New Immigration Crackdowns Creating ‘Chilling Effect’ On 
Crime Reporting, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529513771/new-
immigration-crackdowns-creating-chilling-effect-on-crime-reporting. 
5 Medina, supra note 1. 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2018); see also Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000, div. B, Violence Against Women Act of 2000, tit. V, Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act 
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law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes, thereby pro-
tecting safety of the community more generally; and to further humanitarian 
interests by providing assistance to crime victims.7 To qualify for U sta-
tus, noncitizens are required to establish several elements, including a certi-
fication from a police officer, prosecutor, or judge that the noncitizen was 
the victim of qualifying criminal activity and has been or is willing to be 
helpful in the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing.8 
Advocates and scholars have lauded the U visa’s goals while criticizing 
components of the process, especially the mandatory law enforcement certi-
fication.9 Of particular importance, the willingness of law enforcement of-
ficers to sign U certifications varies tremendously from agency to agency, 
subjecting undocumented victims to “geographic roulette.”10 To be sure, the 
U visa statute and implementing regulations could be clearer in some re-
spects, but many law enforcement agencies have undertaken certification 
policies that are far more restrictive than required by federal law.11 Addi-
tionally, an annual statutory cap of 10,000 visas has led to a lengthy back-
log of pending U applications that will likely take nearly a decade to clear. 
New policies being implemented under the Trump Administration further 
threaten this already fraught scheme. In particular, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is reinvigorating cooperative enforcement 
agreements with state and local police while simultaneously expanding en-
forcement priorities to include those merely charged or suspected of crimi-
nal activity.12 It is clear that the current administration is willing to remove 
deportable noncitizens even if they have pending U visas, and even if they 
                                                                                                             
of 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1533–37, amended by Violence Against Women and 
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, titl. VIII, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 
(2006), amended by Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act - Tech-
nical Corrections, Pub. L. No. 109-271, 120 Stat. 750 (2006) [hereinafter Battered Immigrant Women 
Protection Act of 2000 when referencing § 1513]. 
7 Id.; see infra Part I.A. 
8 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S); id. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (offering temporary immigration relief to immi-
grants who have “suffered substantial physical or mental abuse” as a result of having been victims of 
certain qualifying criminal activity who have been helpful, are being helpful, or are likely to be helpful 
to law enforcement investigating or prosecuting the criminal activity). 
9 See, e.g., Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of Domestic Violence 21–33 
(2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872866; Michael Kagan, Immigrant Vic-
tims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 915, 939–51 (2015); Eunice Hyunhye Cho et al., A 
New Understanding of Substantial Abuse: Evaluating Harm in U Visa Petitions for Immigrant Victims 
of Workplace Crime, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 24–30 (2014); Tahja L. Jensen, U Visa “Certification”: 
Overcoming the Local Hurdle in Response to a Federal Statute, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 691, 700–02 (2009). 
10 JEAN ABREAU ET AL., IMMIGR./HUMAN RTS. POL'Y CLINIC, U. OF N.C. SCH. OF L., THE POLITICAL 
GEOGRAPHY OF THE U VISA: ELIGIBILITY AS A MATTER OF LOCALE 22 (2014), 
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/uvisa/fullreport.pdf. 
11 See infra Part II.A; see also ABREAU ET AL., supra note 10, at 54–55. 
12 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Interior EO]; see also infra Part II.B. 
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do not have a criminal record.13 One predictable consequence of these 
changes is that undocumented noncitizens who experience serious crime 
will be even more afraid to report to the police, allowing perpetrators to re-
main at large and leaving survivors and their families vulnerable to further 
harm, particularly in domestic violence situations.14 Ironically, this result 
conflicts with another stated initiative of the Trump Administration: 
fighting crime.15 
This symposium essay explains these obstacles and then outlines five 
concrete reforms that would ameliorate the problems we identify, improv-
ing the effectiveness of the U visa. First, states and municipalities should 
provide more concrete guidance and incentives to law enforcement agencies 
to ensure that victims who report a crime and who are willing to provide as-
sistance in the investigation or prosecution of that crime are not erroneously 
deprived of an opportunity to seek the U visa due to locally-imposed con-
straints that exceed federal requirements.16 In addition to legislating (or at 
least clarifying) federal standards and definitions for purposes of U visa cer-
tifications, state or local governments should ensure that officers are aware 
that mere unlawful presence in the United States is not a crime.17 This re-
form is particularly important in jurisdictions that regularly cooperate with 
federal immigration enforcement officials to counteract apprehension about 
the risk of any contact with law enforcement. Relatedly, local law enforce-
ment agencies should make their policies and procedures regarding the U 
visa certification process better known to their communities. Second, the 
federal government should condition 287(g) joint-enforcement agreements 
or the grant of law-enforcement-related federal funds on local law enforce-
ment’s willingness to follow federal standards and definitions regarding the 
U visa criteria. Third, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
should process U visa applications on a more timely basis so that qualified 
applicants can receive deferred action while they await final adjudication 
during the multi-year waitlist caused by the 10,000 visa annual cap. Fourth, 
                                               
13 Melissa Etehad, Denver mother is granted temporary deportation relief after 3 months of sanctuary in 
a church, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-na-denver-mother-relief-
20170512-story.html (relating saga of Jeanette Vizguerra who officials sought to remove despite pend-
ing U visa application and lack of significant criminal history). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 19–26. 
15 See, e.g., Task Force on Crime Reduction & Public Safety, Exec. Order No. 13,776, 82 Fed. Reg. 
10,699 (Feb. 14, 2017). 
16 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.10 (2017) (requiring state and local law enforcement agencies, 
prosecutors, judges, and other specified officials to certify the helpfulness of immigrant crime victims as 
part of the federal U visa certification within 90 days when certain conditions are met). 
17 Unauthorized presence in the U.S. is a crime only if it occurs after an individual was previously re-
moved from the U.S. and then returned without permission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2018). Although enter-
ing the U.S. without authorization is a misdemeanor, a noncitizen’s presence in the U.S. after expiration 
or violation of a visa is not itself a crime. See id. § 1325. 
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Congress should upwardly revise the annual cap to more accurately reflect 
the number of undocumented crime victims who report serious crime each 
year. Fifth and finally, Congress should provide an alternative U visa route 
that allows federal officials to certify qualifying criminal activity and help-
fulness in situations where local officials are unreasonably withholding cer-
tification. 
At the end of the day, no one benefits from a “class of silent victims.”18 
The reforms to the U visa that we suggest are thus critical to achieve Con-
gress’s dual aims of protecting vulnerable noncitizens and fighting crime, 
and acknowledge the rise of local participation in the immigration enforce-
ment process and the expansion of federal enforcement priorities to include 
virtually all undocumented persons. Any of the measures considered here 
would improve upon the current implementation of the U visa. Together, 
they would fully realize the statutory provision’s goals. 
The essay unfolds as follows. In Part I, we briefly explain the U visa re-
quirements and Congress’s objectives in enacting this status. In Part II, we 
outline some of the most significant problems that have developed in the 
implementation of the U visa. In Part III, we turn to a range of federal and 
state solutions that would help address these problems and explain why 
even a restrictionist administration should want to pursue them. 
I. THE U VISA: PURPOSE, BENEFITS, AND ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS  
A. Rationales for a Visa for Noncitizen Crime Victims 
Humanitarian organizations and law enforcement officials have long 
noted a breakdown in communication between noncitizens and law en-
forcement because of fears of deportation.19 In 2000, Congress acknowl-
edged the seriousness of this issue when it created the U visa during consid-
eration of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act 
(VTVPA) and related statutes.20 The U visa is a “nonimmigrant” lawful sta-
                                               
18 Stacey Ivie & Natalie Nanasi, Fed. Bureau of Invest., U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, The U Visa: An Effective Resource for Law Enforcement 10 (2009) (quoting a Virginia police 
detective). 
19 Id. (“The fear of deportation has created a class of silent victims.”); see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
US: IMMIGRANTS ‘AFRAID TO CALL 911’ (May 15, 2014); Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of 
Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 7 GEO. J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43 (2000) (reporting on a study showing that fear of 
being deported is “either the first or second most intimidating factor[] that kept battered immigrants 
from seeking the services they needed to end the abusive relationship”). 
20 See, e.g., Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, supra note 6. 
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tus that Congress intended to be available to noncitizens harmed by serious 
crime in the United States who have the courage to report the crime to law 
enforcement authorities and assist with any investigation.21 
During congressional debate prior to the passage of the VTVPA, many 
members focused on the U visa’s purpose of encouraging a symbiotic work-
ing relationship between law enforcement and noncitizens.22 Proponents of 
the VTVPA acknowledged that immigrants who felt protected by law en-
forcement would be more willing to report crimes and cooperate with po-
lice. For instance, Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee noted, “Battered immigrant 
women and children were not able to appeal to law enforcement agencies 
and courts for protection because they simply feared being reported to the 
[Immigration and Naturalization Service] and deported.”23 In addition to the 
law enforcement purpose of the U status, from the outset Congress was also 
concerned with providing humanitarian aid to noncitizen survivors of seri-
ous crime in this country. Rep. Janice Schakowsky, for example, explained 
that the VTVPA will “strengthen and expand access to a variety of legal 
protections for battered immigrants so they may flee violent homes, obtain 
court protection, cooperate in the criminal prosecution of their abusers and 
take control of their lives without fear of deportation.”24 
By offering protection from removal to those who assist law enforcement 
in solving crimes, the U visa (like the T visa for trafficking survivors) was 
thus designed to promote cooperation between law enforcement and immi-
grant communities by assuaging deportation fears and providing humanitar-
ian relief for crime victims.25 The legislation has been amended multiple 
times since 2000, with wide bipartisan support, under both Republican and 
Democratic administrations.26 
                                               
21 IVIE & NANASI, supra note 18, at 10. 
22 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S10,164–71 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy, “These 
and other important measures will do a great deal to protect battered immigrants and their children from 
domestic violence and free them from the fear that often prevents them from prosecuting these 
crimes.”). 
23 Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration 
and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 65 (2000) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
24 Id. (statement of Rep. Schakowsky). 
25 Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 § 1513(a)(2)(B); see also Kagan, supra note 9, at 
919–29. 
26 See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013); 
see also Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011, H.R. 2830, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 
119 Stat. 2960 (2006), amended by Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthoriza-
tion Act - Technical Corrections, Pub. L. No. 109-271, 120 Stat. 750 (2006). 
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B. Benefits of the U Visa 
The The U visa—more accurately called U status27—provides “nonimmi-
grant” (i.e., temporary) status for a period of four years, but which can be 
extended in some circumstances.28 As part of the U status, noncitizen bene-
ficiaries are authorized to work.29 Recipients of the U visa can also petition 
for certain immediate family members to obtain “derivative U status.”30 No-
tably, noncitizens with U status can apply for lawful permanent resident sta-
tus after three years of lawful continuous presence in the United States if 
they can meet various criteria.31 
A statutory annual cap of 10,000 visas, however, has created a significant 
backlog. Currently, this backlog has created a wait-time for final adjudica-
tion of U status applications that likely verges on a decade.32 We will return 
to the significance of this backlog below in Part II. 
C. Eligibility Requirements 
The U visa statute defines a qualifying noncitizen as an “alien [who] has 
suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a 
victim of criminal activity.”33 The statute defines qualifying “criminal activi-
ty” as: 
[Activity] involving one or more of the following or any similar activity in vio-
lation of Federal, State, or local criminal law: rape; torture; trafficking; incest; 
                                               
27 In this essay, we use the terms “U status” and “U visa” more or less interchangeably, as do most im-
migration officials and advocates. To be more precise, U status is a nonimmigrant status that allows par-
ticular noncitizen victims of crime to temporarily stay in the United States and obtain employment au-
thorization. U visas, on the other hand, permit persons outside the United States who qualify for U 
status, and who are not inadmissible, to process through a U.S. consulate and lawfully enter the country. 
28 Kagan, supra note 9, at 925. 
29 Id. at 917. 
30 See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., VICTIMS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: 
U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-
other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-
nonimmigrant-status.  
31 See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., GREEN CARD FOR A VICTIM OF A 
CRIME (U NONIMMIGRANT) (2011), https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/other-ways-get-green-card/green-
card-victim-crime-u-nonimmigrant. 
32 See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DATA SET: FORM I-918 
APPLICATION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS, FISCAL YEAR 2017, 4TH QUARTER (2017), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%2
0Forms%20Data/Victims/I918u_visastatistics_fy2017_qtr4.pdf (showing 110,511 primary U visa appli-
cations pending as of the end of FY 2017) [hereinafter USCIS, FORM I-918 DATA FY 2017]. Some of 
these pending applications will be denied or abandoned, and noncitizens sometimes are in a position to 
submit more than one U visa application. Thus, it is not possible to predict exactly how long it will take 
to clear the backlog, though it will likely verge on a decade. 
33 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I). 
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domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual 
exploitation; female genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involun-
tary servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; 
false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious as-
sault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, 
or solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned crimes.34 
The breadth of this list shows that Congress intended that victims of a 
wide variety of criminal activity would meet this part of the criteria for U 
status. Three types of noncitizens are within the scope of the U visa. The 
most prototypical group consists of individuals who suffered direct harm as 
result of criminal activity.35 But the agency has also clarified that the statute 
contemplates U status for bystander victims in certain cases—defined as 
persons who are not direct targets, but who experience proximate and “unu-
sually direct injury” as a result of qualifying crime.36 This would include, for 
example, a pregnant woman who suffers a miscarriage from the trauma of 
witnessing violent crime.37 Indirect victims, consisting of certain family 
members of direct victims who are incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, 
also may qualify for U status.38 Federal regulations specify that the qualify-
ing family members who can be indirect victims include: spouses; unmar-
ried children under 21-years-old; parents, if the victim is under 21-years-
old; or siblings under the age of 18, where the victim is under 21-years-old.39  
In addition to satisfying the crime victim requirement, a qualifying indi-
vidual must also show that he or she has “suffered substantial physical or 
mental abuse” as a result of this crime.40 Physical or mental abuse is defined 
as “injury or harm to the victim’s physical person, or harm to or impairment 
of the emotional or psychological soundness of the victim.”41 When deter-
mining the amount of hardship necessary to constitute “substantial” abuse, 
USCIS will consider any credible evidence regarding the nature of the inju-
ry; the perpetrator’s conduct; severity of harm; duration of harm; conse-
quences for the victim’s appearance, health, physical or mental soundness; 
and aggravation of pre-existing conditions.42 An applicant may present evi-
                                               
34 Id. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii). A certification may be issued even when a perpetrator is prosecuted for 
criminal activity that is not listed as a qualifying crime, as long as qualifying criminal activity occurred 
during the commission of non-qualifying activity. 
35 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(14) (2013). 
36 See id.; see also New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity: Eligibility for “U” Nonimmi-
grant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,016–17 (Sept. 17, 2007). 
37 72 Fed. Reg. 53,016–17. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. For purposes of qualifying as an indirect victim, age is determined as of the date of the under-
lying criminal activity. 
40 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I). 
41 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(8). 
42 Id. § 214.14(b)(1). 
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dence of the substantiality of abuse in the form of declarations of the appli-
cant, therapists, or social workers, as well as through medical records, po-
lice reports, or photographs of the injury.43 
Although the “credible evidence” standard is somewhat relaxed, proving 
the requisite level of hardship is by no means guaranteed. As the regulations 
indicate, “the existence of one or more of the factors automatically does not 
create a presumption that the abuse suffered was substantial.”44 The agency 
scrutinizes this factor and regularly denies U status in cases where there are 
no or few physical injuries.45 
Next, and most critically for purposes of this essay, a noncitizen cannot 
apply to federal authorities for a U visa without including a certification 
from law enforcement that the noncitizen was helpful, is being helpful, or is 
likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of qualifying criminal 
activity. These certifications must be completed by a “certifying official” 
within a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, or by the prosecu-
tor, judge, or other authority with responsibility for investigating or prose-
cuting the qualifying criminal activity.46  
Several aspects of the certification requirement are worth elaborating. 
First, Congress chose not to require that the criminal investigation actually 
result in formal charges or a prosecution against the perpetrator.47 The agen-
cy has long confirmed this understanding, and it is reflected in the guidance 
material for law enforcement agencies published by DHS.48 Indeed, no par-
ticular acts on the part of either law enforcement or the noncitizen are re-
quired.49 It is enough that the victim reports the crime and that the law en-
forcement agency has investigated the matter enough to detect qualifying 
                                               
43 Id. § 214.14(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(4) (2018). 
44 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1). 
45 See, e.g., In re Petitioner, 2013 WL 5176075 (Admin. App. Off., Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., U.S. 
Dep't of Homeland Sec. April 18, 2013) (finding “red marks and a scratch . . . which caused her pain” 
and applicant’s credible account that “she can no longer trust men and used to get depressed” to be in-
sufficient evidence of “any permanent or serious harm the incident caused to her appearance, health, or 
physical or mental soundness”); Matter of F-V-V-, 2016 WL 6610949 (Admin. App. Off., Citizenship & 
Immigr. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. Oct. 14, 2016) (finding insufficient evidence of “substantial 
mental abuse” where the perpetrators’ extortion crime caused victim to suffer anxiety, depression, and 
loss of employment). 
46 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(a)(2)–(3). 
47 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(II)–(III). 
48 See WILLIAM R. YATES, CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERIM RELIEF FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS APPLICANTS 4 (2003); see also 
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u_visa_certification_guide.pdf [hereinafter DHS, 
CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
49 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(5). 
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criminal activity.50 On the other hand, by regulation, the noncitizen’s re-
sponsibility to provide reasonably-requested assistance is ongoing through 
the duration of U status.51 Second, neither the statute nor the implementing 
regulations impose any time limit on the criminal activity or the certifica-
tion.52 The qualifying crime can have occurred long ago, even preceding 
passage of the initial U visa legislation, or in situations where the statute of 
limitations for prosecution of the crime has now passed.53 
If law enforcement officials adhere to the federal statute and implement-
ing regulations accurately, they should sign certifications whenever the 
noncitizen is a direct or indirect victim of qualifying criminal activity, so 
long as he or she has not declined any reasonable request for assistance. It 
bears emphasizing that this is no rubber stamp for obtaining the U visa; 
USCIS will determine whether the noncitizen has satisfied the requisite lev-
el of physical or emotional hardship and will independently review each as-
pect of the certification requirements, including whether the criminal activi-
ty is a qualifying crime and whether the applicant is a qualified victim.54 
Nevertheless, nothing constrains the discretion of law enforcement officials 
to impose more onerous conditions than required by federal law, or to simp-
ly refuse to certify at all. Thus, the U scheme transfers significant gatekeep-
ing authority to local law enforcement. 
Finally, a U status applicant must be “admissible” to the United States, 
which is a term of art that applies to both noncitizens outside of the country 
and those within the United States’ borders.55 Where inadmissibility factors 
are present, such as unlawful presence, unlawful employment, or criminal 
history, the noncitizen must convince USCIS that a waiver is appropriate in 
the exercise of discretion.56 USCIS has indicated that where the applicant’s 
criminal history includes serious crimes, waivers will only be granted in 
                                               
50 Id. Therefore, a victim need not testify against the perpetrator, nor must the victim affirmatively pur-
sue law enforcement to assist in the investigation or prosecution of the criminal activity. “Prosecution” 
also extends beyond actively prosecuting a criminal charge to include sentencing, thus extending the 
time period wherein a victim may be helpful. See Joey Hipolito, Illegal Aliens or Deserving Victims: 
The Ambivalent Implementation of the U Visa Program, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 153, 171–72 (2010). 
51 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(3). A certifying official can withdraw certification even after USCIS approval of 
U status if the victim declines a reasonable request in an ongoing investigation or prosecution. Id. § 
214.14(h)(2)(A). 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUPPLEMENT B, 
U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS CERTIFICATION at 1 (2017), http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-918.pdf [here-
inafter USCIS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUPPLEMENT B]. 
55 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(3)(i). 
56 Under the applicable waiver, any ground of inadmissibility may be waived if doing so would be “in 
the public or national interest,” except for those that apply to participants of Nazi executions, genocide, 
acts of torture. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(14). 
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“extraordinary circumstances.”57 In short, while the law enforcement certifi-
cation is a necessary and critical component of an applicant’s bid for U sta-
tus, it is not determinative. 
II. OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U VISA 
For a number of reasons, Congress’s goals in creating the U visa have 
not been adequately realized. Two concerns are of particular importance. 
First, the local implementation of the U visa certification process is incon-
sistent and unreliable. Second, new developments in immigration enforce-
ment are rapidly compounding the problem. These factors combine with the 
now-paltry number of U visas annually available each year to create a situa-
tion that simply cannot accomplish the legislation’s crime-fighting and hu-
manitarian objectives. This Part elaborates on these concerns. 
A. Inconsistent and Unreliable U Visa Certifications 
As an initial matter, the existence of the U status remains unknown to 
many noncitizens who would be within the scope of protection intended by 
Congress. Almost no law enforcement agencies engage in community out-
reach regarding the U visa or publish information about the process and cri-
teria for obtaining a certification of helpfulness. A review of the web pages 
of all 159 counties in Georgia, for example, revealed that as of October 13, 
2016, only one police department had publicly available guidelines on the 
certification process.58 This lack of information leaves victims of even very 
serious crimes without critical information that would encourage 
them to come forward. As a result, the effects of crime on individuals, fami-
lies, and communities remain unmitigated and perpetrators remain at large. 
In part, this lack of transparency may turn on the fact that law enforce-
ment agents themselves remain unclear about the U visa and the certifica-
tion requirements. Although regulations require that each local agency des-
ignate particular officials with authority to sign certifications, at present 
there is no corresponding educational requirement or mechanism for federal 
oversight.59 The only information that the federal government regularly pro-
                                               
57 8 C.F.R. § 212.17(b)(2). 
58 See GWINNETT CTY. GOV’T, U VISA APPLICATION CERTIFICATION REQUESTS (2018), 
https://www.gwinnettcounty.com/portal/gwinnett/Departments/Solicitor/VictimWitness/UVisaInformati
on. 
59 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2)–(3) (indicating certifying official includes a federal, state or local judge, 
or any other person in a supervisory role at any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, child 
protective services, the Department of Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or other 
agency with authority to detect, investigate, or prosecute crime in their respective area of expertise, who 
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vides to local law enforcement regarding the U visa or certifications con-
sists of the instructions to Form I-918, Supp. B, and a “Law Enforcement 
Certification Resource Guide” that DHS publishes online.60 
Due to the lack of training and oversight regarding law enforcement’s 
role in the U visa scheme, many law enforcement officials are either unfa-
miliar with or misinformed about federal standards for the U visa.61 Conse-
quently, it typically falls to advocates at nonprofit organizations (and some-
times immigration law firms) not only to track down the proper official to 
sign an applicant’s certification, but also to educate that official about the 
criteria for issuing a certification.62 In effect, then, DHS has delegated the 
responsibility of educating and guiding law enforcement agencies to non-
profits and private stakeholders. 
One consequential drawback of this obligation is that time and effort 
spent on law enforcement advocacy and education cuts into the resources 
these already-strapped legal-services providers can devote to representing 
their clients.63 And, to be sure, there is no guarantee that such efforts will 
even be successful. Furthermore, individuals who are detained or who live 
in areas without nonprofits or attorneys with immigration knowledge will 
face the nearly impossible task of ascertaining and navigating the certifica-
tion process pro se. The predictable result is that many are unable to access 
the protection intended by Congress. 
Even more critically, law enforcement officials often fail to sign certifi-
cations even where a noncitizen’s eligibility for U status is clear. There is 
no mechanism to compel law enforcement officials to sign a certification, 
and there is no appellate review of a law enforcement official’s refusal to 
issue a certification.64 The statute and federal regulations currently do not 
provide any alternative to the certification process or any measure of over-
sight for recalcitrant law-enforcement agents.65 Indeed, USCIS-generated 
instructions for the certification form advise local officials that they are un-
der “no legal obligation” to sign the certification.66 The result is that local 
law enforcement officials have complete discretion to determine which 
noncitizen crime victims, if any, should be permitted to seek the relief that 
                                                                                                             
has been specifically designated by the head of the certifying agency to issue U nonimmigrant status 
certifications on behalf of that agency). 
60 See USCIS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUPPLEMENT B, supra note 54, at 2; DHS, CERTIFICATION RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra note 48. 
61 See Jensen, supra note 9, at 703. 
62 See Nora Phillips, U Visas for Immigrant Victims of Crime, CHI. BAR ASS'N REC. at 42, 44 (2008). 
63 See Jensen, supra note 9, at 703. 
64 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14. 
65 See, e.g., id. § 214.14(c)(ii)(2)(i). 
66 See USCIS, Instructions for Supplement B, supra note 54; Abreau et al., supra note 10, at 9. 
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Congress intended them to have when it created the U visa.67 
Unsurprisingly, many jurisdictions and individual officials implement the 
certification process in ways that go beyond or conflict with federal eligibil-
ity requirements. Several national studies of law enforcement agencies have 
revealed that in hundreds of jurisdictions officials either refuse to sign certi-
fications completely or impose restrictive limitations on the circumstances 
in which they will sign.68 Common limitations include that the crime oc-
curred too long ago, or too recently, or there was no prosecution or convic-
tion, or because, in the law enforcement official’s view, the noncitizen did 
not suffer substantial harm.69 Yet other jurisdictions will not sign certifica-
tions unless the noncitizen demonstrates extraordinary “helpfulness” in the 
investigation or prosecution.70 
And because local law enforcement officials are under no obligation to 
sign the certifications even where the noncitizen is willing to cooperate in 
the investigation and clearly meets the eligibility criteria, many simply re-
fuse to sign altogether. Some law enforcement officials are immigration-
restrictionists who oppose the U visa or any federal assistance for undocu-
mented persons who cooperate with law enforcement.71 Others simply do 
not see the U visa as within the scope of their duty, or they determine 
whether to sign in individual cases through seemingly arbitrary factors.72 
 
                                               
67 See Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual Purposes of the U Visa Thwarted in a Legislative Due, 29 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 373, 392 (2010) (arguing that the federal decision to devolve immigration power to lo-
cal authorities “fatally altered the symbiotic balance that Congress envisioned” with the U visa). 
68 See ABREAU ET AL., supra note 10, at 3; see also NATALIA LEE ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGR. WOMEN’S 
ADVOC. PROJECT, NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS ON POLICE RESPONSE TO IMMIGRANT 
CRIME VICTIMS: U VISA CERTIFICATION AND LANGUAGE ACCESS 13–14 (2013) (explaining the reasons 
given by agencies in defense of their decisions to decline to sign certifications). 
69 ABREAU ET AL., supra note 10, at 14; LEE ET AL., supra note 68, at 13–14; see also Nanasi, supra note 
9, at 21–33; Derek Quizon & Katie Urbaszewski, Visa Rules are Loose for Illegal Immigrants Who are 
Victims of Crimes, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2010/08/19/20100819arizona-illegal-
immigrants-visas.html (reporting divergent and inconsistent approaches to U visa certifications across 
prosecutors’ offices). 
70 Anna Gorman, U-visa Program for Crime Victims Falters, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/26/local/me-crimevisa26. 
71 Id. 
72 See, e.g., ABREAU ET AL., supra note 10, at 27 (reporting that 165 law enforcement agencies across 35 
states will never sign U status circumstances); id. at 20 (reporting that the police chief in Minnesota 
“would not feel ‘comfortable’ certifying U visa applications to anyone that he did not know personal-
ly”); LEE ET AL., supra note 68, at 14 (reporting that some law enforcement agencies won’t sign certifi-
cations due to misconceptions regarding the legal parameters and requirements of the visa); Nanasi, su-
pra note 9, at 25 n.121 (reporting immigration advocate’s quip that “as I think many others have already 
said, NYPD won’t grant certs . . . if they don’t feel like it.”). 
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B. Expansion of Federal Removal Priorities and Increased Immigration 
Enforcement by Local Authorities Further Threatens This Already-
Fraught Scheme 
A series of Executive Orders on immigration enforcement, signed within 
one week of President Trump’s inauguration, quickly made the situation 
even more precarious for crime victims who lack immigration status. On 
January 25, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13,768: En-
hancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (hereinafter “Inte-
rior EO”), which details the Administration’s new priorities for the en-
forcement of immigration law in the United States.73 Among other important 
changes, the Interior EO broadens the concept of “criminal alien” to include 
noncitizens who have not yet been convicted of any crime. Specifically, 
section 5 of the Interior EO states the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
“prioritize for removal” noncitizens who: 
(a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense; 
(b) Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such 
charge has not yet been resolved; 
(c) Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable offense; 
(d) Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in connec-
tion with any official matter or application before a governmen-
tal agency; 
(e) Have abused any program related to the receipt of public bene-
fits; 
(f) Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not yet 
complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; 
or 
(g) In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk 
to public safety or national security.74 
On the same day, President Trump signed another Executive Order titled 
“Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements” (hereinafter 
“Enforcement Improvements EO”), which further establishes the new Ad-
ministration’s intended approach regarding noncitizens suspected of com-
mitting crimes.75 Relevantly, the Enforcement Improvements EO indicates 
                                               
73 Interior EO, supra note 12, at 8800.  
74 Id. 
75 Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 
8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Enforcement Improvements EO]. 
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that immigration authorities will “detain individuals apprehended on suspi-
cion of violating Federal or State law, including Federal immigration law.”76  
Together, the Enforcement Improvements EO and the Interior EO have 
serious implications for many individuals seeking U visa status. Because 
the Interior EO prioritizes the removal of noncitizens who have committed 
any act that could be charged as a crime, all noncitizens believed to have 
entered without inspection are now priorities, because illegal entry is de-
fined as a misdemeanor under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a).77 Moreover, as advocacy 
organizations have noted, because the broad language of the EO captures 
any act that could “constitute a chargeable criminal offense,” the new en-
forcement priorities would seem to include persons suspected of even “very 
minor offenses such as jaywalking and driving without a license.”78 
Statements from top agency officials have repeatedly emphasized the 
breadth of these expanded priorities. Then-Secretary of Homeland Security 
John Kelly stated, “The laws on the books are pretty straightforward. If 
you’re here illegally, you should leave or you should be deported, put 
through the system.”79 Secretary Kelly issued new memoranda at the outset 
of his appointment that abandoned the Obama-era prosecutorial discretion 
guidelines as agency-wide policy.80 Likewise, in a February 2017 memo, 
ICE Associate Director Matthew Albence instructed deportation officers to 
“take enforcement action against all removable aliens encountered in the 
course of their duties.”81 Acting Director of ICE Thomas Homan reiterated 
                                               
76 Id. 
77 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
78 See Interior EO, supra note 12; AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS'N & AM. IMMIGR. COUNS., SUMMARY AND 
QUESTIONS/ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER “ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY IN THE INTERIOR OF THE 
UNITED STATES” at 3 (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.aila.org/infonet/summary-brief-analysis-of-trump-
executive-orders. 
79 Kery Murakami, Immigrant deportations up sharply under Trump, MANKATO FREE PRESS (Aug. 19, 
2017), http://www.mankatofreepress.com/news/local_news/immigrant-deportations-up-sharply-under-
trump/article_a2b7b8d3-d00b-5839-9f1d-8de5d83b3696.html (reporting ICE’s statement that the agen-
cy is no longer exercising leniency with respect to undocumented residents who have not committed 
weighty crimes); Dan Merica, Kelly sworn in as Trump’s second chief of staff, CNN (July 31, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/politics/john-kelly-chief-of-staff/index.html (describing John Kelly’s 
appointment as Chief of Staff, requiring him to vacate the position at the Department of Homeland Se-
curity); Chuck Todd, Full Kelly Interview: Visa Overstays Are a “Big Problem,” NBC (Apr. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/full-kelly-interview-visa-overstays-are-a-big-problem-
for-immigration-enforcement-922041923875. 
80 See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security Sec. John Kelly to U.S. Customs & Border 
Protection Acting Comm’r Kevin McAleenan et al. on “Enforcement of Immigration Laws to Serve the 
National Interest” (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-
Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Sec. Kelly to Acting Comm'r 
McAleenan et al.]. 
81 Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Immigration & Customs Enforcement Exec. 
Assoc. Dir. Matthew Albence to All Enforcement & Removal Operations Employees at 1 (Feb. 21, 
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the Administration’s commitment to this approach in December 2017, stat-
ing, “There’s no population off the table. If you’re in this country illegally, 
we’re looking for you and we’re going to apprehend you.”82 Regional ICE 
directors have sounded much the same theme.83 
A central strategy of the new Administration to effectuate these expand-
ed enforcement priorities revolves around empowering, and, if necessary, 
coercing “state and local law enforcement agencies across the country to 
perform the functions of an immigration officer in the interior of the United 
States to the maximum extent permitted by law.”84 There are several compo-
nents to this effort. First, the federal government has reinvigorated joint 
federal-state enforcement programs, and in particular, 287(g) agreements,85 
Secure Communities,86 and the Criminal Alien Program.87 
Section 287(g) became law as a part of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.88 In essence, 287(g) enforcement 
programs deputize state and local police officers to enforce federal immi-
gration laws. These programs allow local law enforcement officers to inves-
tigate immigration status, and, if the person appears to be deportable, to de-
tain and turn them over to federal agents.89 The number of 287(g) programs 
had declined significantly before Trump took office, after evidence emerged 
that their implementation precipitated discriminatory policing and increased 
mistrust of law enforcement while being costly and ineffective in appre-
hending serious offenders.90 One study of the 287(g) program in Nashville, 
Tennessee, based on two years of data, revealed that its implementation led 
to significant racial profiling and public trust concerns.91 Other studies of 
                                                                                                             
2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3889695-doc00801320170630123624.html (empha-
sis added). 
82 Adam K. Raymond, Deportations Are Down Under Trump, But Arrests of Non-Criminal Immigrants 
Surge, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/12/deportations-are-
down-as-immigration-arrests-surge.html.  
83 See, e.g., Vivian Yee, “Please, God, Don’t Let Me Get Stopped”: Around Atlanta, No Sanctuary for 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/us/atlanta-immigration-
arrests.html (quoting Atlanta ICE field officer director Sean Gallagher as saying, “If you’re in this coun-
try illegally, you should be scared. We’re probably going to come knocking at some point.”). 
84 Interior EO, supra note 12, at 8880. 
85 See id. at 8800 (announcing in section 8(a) that federal agencies will seek to enact 278(g) cooperative 
enforcement agreements with local authorities). 
86 See id. at 8801 (announcing in section 10(a) that federal agencies will reinstate the Secure Communi-
ties program). 
87 See Memorandum from Sec. Kelly to Acting Comm'r McAleenan et al., supra note 80. 
88 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–547 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)). 
89 Id. 
90 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE 287(G) PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 2, 4–6 (2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_287g_program_an_overvie
w_0.pdf. 
91 See Amanda Armenta, Between Public Service and Social Control: Policing Dilemmas in the Era of 
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cooperative enforcement programs around the country demonstrated similar 
problems with discriminatory policing.92 
Still other reports indicate that the 287(g) program “has been costly for 
localities, has not focused on serious criminals, and has harmed the rela-
tionship between police and local communities.”93 For example, the Migra-
tion Policy Institute (MPI) conducted a comprehensive analysis of the 
287(g) program and found that many programs did not target serious crimi-
nal offenders. Many jurisdictions implemented an enforcement model de-
signed to identify as many unauthorized immigrants as possible, regardless 
of criminal history.94 MPI’s study revealed that half of all detainers issued 
through the 287(g) program as of 2011 nabbed noncitizens who had com-
mitted only misdemeanors and traffic offenses, rather than serious or vio-
lent crime.95 
Many law enforcement agencies recognize the problems these enforce-
ment practices can create with respect to public trust. The Police Executive 
Research Forum, for example, interviewed law enforcement executives who 
stated that by enforcing federal immigration law, the sheriff’s office “poi-
soned the relationship between law enforcement and Latinos, hindering 
general law enforcement efforts within the Latino community.”96 Similarly, 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, commented:  
Local police agencies depend on the cooperation of immigrants, legal and [oth-
erwise], in solving all sorts of crimes and in the maintenance of public order. 
Without assurances that they will not be subject to an immigration investigation 
and possible deportation, many immigrants with critical information would not 
come forward, even when heinous crimes are committed against them and their 
families.97  
 
                                                                                                             
Immigration Enforcement, 63 SOC. PROBS. 111, 121–22 (2016). 
92 See, e.g., Edgar Aguilasocho et al., Immigr. Rts. Clinic, U. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of L., Misplaced Priori-
ties: The Failure of Secure Communities in Los Angeles County 16–18 (2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012283 (noting increased racial profiling in polic-
ing in LA County following the implementation of the Secure Communities program); Michael Coon, 
Local Immigration Enforcement and Arrests of the Hispanic Population, 5 J. Migration & Hum. Sec. 
645, 646 (2017) (finding that 287(g) program in Frederick Co., Maryland led to “significantly higher 
number of arrests of Hispanics by the Sheriff’s Office than would have occurred in its absence”); Trevor 
Gardner II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal Alien Program, Chief 
Just. Earl Warren Inst. on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity (2009), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf. 
93 Am. Immigr. Council, supra note 90, at 1. 
94 Randy Capps et al., Migration Pol’y Inst., Delegation and Divergence: 287(g) State and Local Immi-
gration Enforcement at 20 (2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/delegation-and-divergence-
287g-state-and-local-immigration-enforcement. 
95 Id. at 2. 
96 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, surpa note 90, at 6. 
97 Id.  
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Likewise, over a decade ago, a group of police chiefs from the 64 largest 
police departments found that “without assurances that contact with the po-
lice would not result in purely civil immigration enforcement action, the 
hard won trust, communication and cooperation from the immigrant com-
munity would disappear.”98 
Despite this history, many jurisdictions are again embracing an expanded 
role in federal immigration enforcement. ICE arrests of noncitizens in 
Georgia, for example, have increased 80 percent, in part because “sheriffs 
and the police have been working with federal agents to identify and detain 
immigrants, a model of cooperation that the Trump administration is rapidly 
trying to expand throughout the country.”99 As of October 3, 2017, ICE has 
entered into 287(g) agreements with 60 law enforcement agencies in 18 
states—double the number of agreements in effect on the day that Trump 
signed the Enforcement Improvements EO and the Interior EO (collective-
ly, the “EOs”).100 This number is likely to continue to rise as jurisdictions 
contemplate new (or rekindled) joint enforcement agreements.101 
With increased assistance from local authorities, ICE arrested more than 
41,200 undocumented immigrants in the 100 days after Trump signed the 
EOs. The number of arrests represents a 38 percent increase from the same 
time period in 2016. However, “non-criminal arrests” accounted for nearly 
one-fourth of that number.102 The 10,800 non-criminal immigration arrests 
made nationwide between January 25 and April 29, 2017, represent a 150 
percent increase from the non-criminal arrests made during the same time 
period in 2016.103  
The expanded enforcement priorities and rising role of state and local 
law enforcement agencies in the deportation machinery have reignited fear 
                                               
98 MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGR. COMM., ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL POLICE 
AGENCIES at 6 (2005), https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/MCC_Position_Statement.pdf. 
99 Yee, supra note 83. 
100 IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DELEGATION OF 
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (2018), 
https://www.ice.gov/287g. 
101 See, e.g., Jeremy Redmon, Georgia could see expansion in immigration enforcement program, 
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.myajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--
politics/georgia-could-see-expansion-immigration-enforcement-
program/wmCAGpUmwXVRS7NpSKg46O/. 
102 See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a); Aria Bendix, Immigrant Arrests Are Up, But Deportation is Down, Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ 
(May 17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/05/under-trump-immigrants-arrests-
are-up-but-deportation-is-down/527103/. 
103 Bendix, supra note 102; see also IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT at 2 (2017), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf (showing that 
immigration arrests of noncitizens without criminal histories more than doubled under the Trump Ad-
ministration, while immigration arrests generally rose by 42 percent).  
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and distrust in immigrant communities. A survey of hundreds of advocates 
and legal service providers in 46 states found that noncitizens increasingly 
are afraid to call police, press charges, or testify at trial, in part because 
immigration officials are now making arrests at courthouses.104 Panic within 
these communities was incited by incidents such as the courthouse arrest of 
an undocumented woman seeking a protective order against her abusive 
boyfriend in February 2017.105 Although the woman had no outstanding war-
rants, ICE agents arrested the woman at an El Paso hearing as she peti-
tioned for the protective order. ICE has said it will continue to make court-
house arrests, spreading fear among immigrant communities, silencing 
victims, and further diminishing trust between noncitizens and law en-
forcement.106 
Rising fear of interactions with law enforcement can be seen in a recent 
reduction in noncitizens’ willingness to report crime in cities throughout the 
country. Most significantly, reports of domestic violence and sexual assault 
have plummeted. In Houston, Texas, for example, the number of Hispanic-
reported aggravated assaults is down 12 percent.107 Texas police department 
data show that sexual assault reports dropped 43 percent in the first three 
months of this year, as compared to last year.108 Similarly, Los Angeles Po-
lice Chief Charlie Beck reported sexual assaults have dropped 25 percent, 
and domestic violence reports have dropped 10 percent among the city’s 
Latino population.109 The chilling effect on crime reporting is not isolated to 
border states. Police in New Jersey reported a six percent decrease in 2017 
in service calls from communities that are made up predominantly of un-
documented residents.110 
To be sure, not all local law enforcement agencies have adopted stricter 
immigration enforcement under the Trump Administration. In February 
2017, several counties announced plans to terminate their existing 287(g) 
agreements.111 Although some counties, such as Harris County, Texas, stated 
                                               
104 TAHIRIH JUST. CTR., 2017 ADVOCATE AND LEGAL SERVICE SURVEY REGARDING IMMIGRANT 
SURVIVORS (2017), http://www.tahirih.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-Advocate-and-Legal-
Service-Survey-Key-Findings.pdf.  
105 Tom Dart, Undocumented Texas woman arrested while seeking domestic violence help, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 16, 2017, 6:58 p.m.), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/16/texas-undocumented-
woman-arrested-el-paso-domestic-violence. 
106 Tom Dart, Fearing Deportation, undocumented immigrants wary of reporting crimes, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 23, 2017, 6:30 a.m.), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/23/undocumented-
immigrants-wary-report-crimes-deportation. 
107 Burnett, supra note 4. 
108 Id. 
109 Queally, supra note 4. 
110 Bever, supra note 4. 
111 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 6. 
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the termination was based on resource allocation issues, sheriffs in other 
counties indicated that enforcement outcomes do not appear to justify the 
287(g) agreements.112 Sheriff Eric Severson of Waukesha County, Wiscon-
sin, for example, testified in a Senate hearing that “instances of criminal ac-
tivity of illegally present immigrants beyond their status is relatively un-
common in my County and generally in Wisconsin.”113 And, in an effort to 
counteract the tension between immigrant communities and law enforce-
ment that is precipitated by 287(g) programs, some law enforcement agen-
cies have released unofficial assurances to immigrants, promising that crime 
survivors could continue seek law enforcement assistance without fear of 
immigration enforcement consequences.114 
Other jurisdictions have not only declined to enter into 287(g) or related 
official enforcement-cooperation agreements, but also limited the circum-
stances under which they will comply with immigration detainers, provide 
access to federal enforcers, or acquire information regarding the immigra-
tion status of noncitizens encountered in the course of their duties.115 The 
reasons that cities enact such policies vary from place to place, but a central 
motivating factor tends to be the desire to foster circumstances in which 
noncitizens will not fear police, increasing public safety for the entire com-
munity.116 
The Trump Administration has endeavored to penalize some of these lo-
cal jurisdictions through deprivation of various federal law enforcement 
funds. The Interior EO made clear that the Executive Branch would seek to 
“ensure that jurisdictions that fail to comply with applicable Federal law do 
not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law,”117 and the Admin-
istration has made good on its threats to try to punish state and local law en-
forcement agencies that do not fully enforce federal immigration mandates, 
whatever their motivation for doing so. In March 2017, Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions announced he would cut federal funding to so-called sanctu-
                                               
112 Id. 
113 The Effects of Border Insecurity and Lax Immigration Enforcement on American Communities: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 115th Cong. 1 (2017) 
(statement of Eric J. Severson, Sheriff, Waukesha Cty., Wisconsin). 
114 See Megan Cassidy & Yihyun Jeong, Many Arizona Police Agencies Show Little Appetite for New 
Executive Order on Immigration Enforcement, AZCᴇɴᴛʀᴀʟ (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2017/02/02/arizona-police-agencies-trump-
executive-order-immigration-enforcement/97269046/. 
115 See Don Babwin, Chicago Asks for National Halt to Trump Immigration Rules, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 11, 
2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/illinois/articles/2017-09-11/chicagos-lawsuit-over-
sanctuary-city-threat-goes-to-court. 
116 See Dart, supra note 106. 
117 Interior EO, supra note 12, at 8799. 
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ary jurisdictions.118 Significant litigation has ensued, in which the targeted 
cities have challenged the constitutionality of the Administration’s power to 
coerce them into carrying out a federal immigration enforcement agenda 
through restrictions of federal funding.119 On November 21, 2017, District 
Judge William H. Orrick in San Francisco issued a permanent injunction 
blocking the funding penalty as beyond the scope of executive authority.120 
Despite these sites of resistance, however, the fact remains that many lo-
cal jurisdictions are embracing or at least accepting their role in the Trump 
Administration’s immigration enforcement crackdown. And even in those 
locales that have more protective policies in place, individual officers (or 
individual circumstances) could mean that a noncitizen’s decision to report 
crime could as readily lead to his or her deportation as to a U visa. In sum, 
the administration’s enforcement priorities and methods are likely to in-
crease tension and distrust between immigrants and law enforcement. 
Without assurances or specific guidance regarding the role of state and local 
law enforcement in the U visa process, the Executive Orders will continue 
to discourage cooperation between noncitizens and law enforcement. As a 
result, victims will be even more apprehensive about approaching law en-
forcement to report crimes for fear that they themselves will be detained or 
placed in removal proceedings, even if they lack a criminal record or have 
not committed any unlawful acts besides illegal entry into the United States. 
below. 
C. The Annual Cap of 10,000 U Visas Compounds These Problems 
The implementation problems described in the preceding sections are ex-
acerbated by the statutory 10,000 annual cap on U visas.121 It did not take 
long for backlogs to develop once the process for applying opened, in part 
because the agency failed to issue implementing regulations for more than 
                                               
118 U.S. Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Mar. 27, 2017). 
119 See Forrest G. Read IV, Trump Administration Stops Law Enforcement Funds to Chicago, Sanctuary 
City, and Gets Sued, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trump-
administration-stops-law-enforcement-funds-to-chicago-sanctuary-city-and-gets (reporting on Chicago’s 
lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction in a challenge to the Trump Administration’s decision to condi-
tion Justice Assistance Grants to law enforcement on local cooperation with immigration officials); Joel 
Rubin, L.A. looks to join fight against Trump administration over threats to withhold anti-crime funds 
for 'sanctuary' cities, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
sanctuary-city-lawsuit-20170822-story.html; Vivian Lee, Judge Blocks Trump Effort to Withhold Money 
From Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/judge-
blocks-trump-sanctuary-cities.html. 
120 Eli Rosenberg, Federal judge blocks Trump’s executive order on denying funding to sanctuary cities, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/21/federal-
judge-blocks-trumps-executive-order-on-denying-funding-to-sanctuary-
cities/?utm_term=.0cef3c280c3c. 
121 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2)(A). The cap only applies to principal applicants. 
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seven years after Congress first created the U visa.122 Federal regulations 
now provide that U status applications can be filed after the 10,000 cap is 
reached, but the statutory limitation still results in an ever-lengthening wait 
period.123 As of the end of fiscal year 2017, 110,511 U status primary appli-
cations remained pending—a number that will take a decade to clear unless 
the statutory cap is amended.124 Although USCIS is authorized to grant con-
ditional U status approvals along with deferred action in the interim be-
tween application and final adjudication, it has not prioritized resources to 
this end.125 Consequently, current applicants likely must wait many years—
possibly verging on a decade—even for that temporary measure.126 Thus, 
even where local law enforcement is willing to sign certifications for crime 
victims who come forward, they remain in a precarious limbo. The statutory 
cap, along with the agency’s current approach to the backlog, ultimately 
contribute to the on-the-ground dynamics that frustrate Congress’s goals 
when it created the U visa. 
D. Summary of Obstacles to an Effective U Visa Program 
As federal enforcement priorities expand and local roles in immigration 
enforcement become increasingly ramped up through joint federal-state co-
operative programs such as 287(g) agreements, so do noncitizens’ concerns 
that they will be asked about immigration status or turned over to immigra-
tion authorities if they come forward to report crime. While some local law 
enforcement agencies are resisting the new immigration enforcement priori-
ties and the efficacy of 287(g) agreements, many others are taking an active 
role in immigration enforcement.  
As currently implemented, the U visa is an ineffective counterweight 
against noncitizens’ fear of deportation, especially in jurisdictions that em-
brace cooperation with federal enforcers. In many communities, there is lit-
tle publicly available information about the criteria or procedures for ob-
taining a U visa certification. And even when victims or their advocates are 
                                               
122 Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 891, 912 (2008) (describing the seven-year agency delay in promulgating regulations fol-
lowing statutory enactment of the U visa). 
123 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2). 
124 See USCIS, FORM I-918 DATA FY 2017, supra note 32. For reasons discussed above, supra note 32, 
it is difficult to predict exactly how long it will take to clear the current backlog. 
125 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2).  
126 Historically, immigration officials began processing U applications and adjudicating those eligible 
for conditional approval at least one year before a visa would be available to the applicant. See SARAH 
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aware of the visa, many law enforcement agencies refuse to sign certifica-
tions, or employ constraints that exceed federal standards. Moreover, a 
signed U certification is only the first step in a lengthy process. The tre-
mendous backlog in adjudications at the federal level means that nonciti-
zens will remain in a precarious limbo while their applications languish for 
the better part of a decade. Consequently, Congress’s goals for the U visa 
are inadequately realized, making communities less safe and failing to offer 
the intended protection for victims of serious crime. 
III. FIVE REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE U VISA 
In Part II, we explained how new federal policies, including the reinvig-
oration of local roles in immigration enforcement, exacerbate problems that 
have long-hampered the effectiveness of the U visa. In this Part, we lay out 
five reforms that would help ensure the U visa furthers the humanitarian 
and crime-fighting goals that Congress intended. Some of these reforms 
could be implemented at the state or local level, some are in the hands of 
the Executive Branch of the federal government, and some lie with Con-
gress.  
A. State and Local Measures to Encourage Noncitizen Victims to Report 
Crime and Certifying Officials toAdhere to Federal Law 
Many states and municipalities may wish to increase the likelihood that 
noncitizens will report crime and help bring perpetrators to justice. 
Measures furthering those goals may be more viable in jurisdictions that al-
ready resist being co-opted into the Trump Administration’s immigration 
crackdown. But because public safety has universal salience, even jurisdic-
tions in which local law enforcement officers readily cooperate with immi-
gration enforcement would likely at least want to consider actions to in-
crease the trust of noncitizens who are victims of crime. A number of 
recommendations could be readily implemented without the need for legis-
lation and regardless of whether any changes are forthcoming at the federal 
level. 
One small but important measure in this regard would be to simply in-
crease community awareness of the local agency’s requirements and pro-
cess for seeking a U visa certification, whatever they may be. This transpar-
ency could be achieved through a variety of means. First, law enforcement 
and government community outreach programs could promote awareness of 
the existence of the U visa and procedures necessary to obtain police certi-
fication. In general, community outreach has been shown to be an increas-
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ingly effective policing method to promote cooperation with law enforce-
ment and thereby decrease crime rates.127 Presentations in public schools, 
particularly those located in districts with large immigrant populations, 
would educate the children of noncitizens who experience crime, as well as 
young victims, about their options, and, in particular, the potential resources 
available through the U visa. These events should describe the U visa, the 
application process, and local police certification procedures. Similar 
presentations could be given at town halls and community centers. In addi-
tion to communicating valuable information, these events might work to 
humanize local law enforcement officials and noncitizen residents to each 
other. Ideally, these kinds of efforts would not only increase immigrants’ 
trust in their local officials, but also law enforcement’s trust of immi-
grants.128 
Relatedly, law enforcement agencies should also publicize information 
about the U visa and local certification procedures in written materials. This 
could be done on agency websites, pamphlets, newspapers, or other publi-
cations distributed to residents. Ideally, the materials would also be availa-
ble in Spanish and any other languages common to the community. Such 
web pages and publications could briefly outline the U visa, explain who 
may qualify for U visa relief, and provide contact information for the local 
law enforcement officials designated to review and sign certifications. It 
bears emphasizing that knowledge of the U visa and local procedures for 
seeking a law enforcement certification would help protect all community 
members from criminal acts, because survivors would be more likely to 
come forward with information that could solve or deter crimes. 
Another set of state and local approaches would work to decrease noncit-
izens’ apprehensiveness about reporting crime by making the certification 
process more consistent and by limiting or discouraging enforcement ac-
tions against cooperating crime victims. As discussed in Part II, many law 
enforcement agencies or officials do not consistently sign U visa certifica-
tions, or otherwise impose constraints that go beyond federal requirements 
for U visa certifications. Additionally, some jurisdictions detain potentially-
deportable noncitizens and hand them over to ICE for deportation proceed-
ings even where they would clearly meet the criteria for a U visa.129 Both of 
these measures are counterproductive in the fight against crime and the pro-
tection of victims. State and municipal governments who want noncitizens 
                                               
127 NAT’L INST. OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PROGRAM PROFILE: 
OPERATION PEACEKEEPER (2011), https://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=51. 
128 CHRIS COGNAC, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., READY, SET, ENGAGE! 
IDEAS AND OPTIONS FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIP BUILDING (2015), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/06-2015/community_engagement_and_partnership_building.asp. 
129 See Caplan-Bricker, supra note 4. 
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to feel able to come forward to report crime and help bring perpetrators to 
justice should take measures that would bring local U visa policy better into 
line with federal law. Such measures should include, at a minimum, efforts 
to encourage signing certifications in appropriate cases under federal law.  
The most effective approach along these lines would be for states to en-
act legislation that implements federal requirements for U visa certifica-
tions. A number of states have passed statutes that define various standards 
for handling U visa matters.130 Most notably, California recently passed a 
law that adopted federal definitions for U visa certifications and enacted a 
rebuttable presumption that noncitizens who report crime meet the helpful-
ness requirement.131 Replicating federal definitions for the U visa criteria in 
state law and instituting a rebuttable presumption of helpfulness for nonciti-
zens who report qualifying criminal activity would go a long way toward 
ensuring that law enforcement officials handle certification requests in a fair 
and consistent way. In turn, this approach would significantly reduce 
noncitizen crime victims’ fear and uncertainty about coming forward. 
If legislation is not in the cards within a particular state, due to political 
opposition or other obstacles, state or municipal governments should at 
least provide regular training and guidance to law enforcement agencies re-
garding the federal requirements for U visa certifications. In many cases, 
these trainings could be funded through continuing professional education 
funds or law enforcement grants. In an era of intense local involvement in 
immigration enforcement matters, training of law enforcement is more es-
sential than ever to ensure officers are aware of the existence of U visas and 
the actual federal requirements for U visa certifications. State or local gov-
ernments could provide local agencies with a set of criteria to guide certify-
ing officials. This guidance could clarify that state officials should employ 
federal U visa standards and indicate specific criteria that would indicate 
circumstances under which law enforcement officials should typically pro-
vide noncitizens with police certifications.132 Additionally, and particularly 
                                               
130 See SALLY KINOSHITA & ALISON KAMHI, IMMIGR. LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., A GUIDE TO OBTAINING 
U CERTIFICATIONS at 4 (2017), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/u_visa_certification_advisory_ab.ak_.pdf (discussing 
legislation relevant to U visa certifications in Arkansas, California, Delaware, Louisiana, Montana, and 
North Dakota).  
131 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.10(f) (creating a “rebuttable presumption” that an immigrant victim is 
helpful, has been helpful, or is likely to be helpful, if the victim has not refused or failed to provide in-
formation and assistance reasonably requested by law enforcement and requiring certifying entities to 
complete the certification within 90 days of the request in typical cases). 
132 For example, state or local policy or laws could include a checklist for certification with criteria such 
as the following: (1) the alleged crime occurred at any time in the United States and is a qualifying 
crime as defined the U visa statute; (2) the victim reported the crime to a law enforcement agency; and 
(3) the victim has complied with any reasonable requests for assistance with the investigation or prose-
cution of the crime including, but not limited to: indicating willingness to be helpful even if law en-
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in jurisdictions that engage in cooperative enforcement with ICE, state or 
local policy should encourage law enforcement officers to refrain from re-
porting cooperating crime victims to ICE, at least absent significant nega-
tive factors.  
B. Conditioning 287(g) Agreements and Law Enforcement Grants on 
Compliance with Federal Law for U Certifications 
If the Executive Branch is serious about fighting crime, it should take 
measures that counteract the fear and uncertainty that noncitizens face when 
deciding whether to report crime to law enforcement officials. One effective 
measure would be to condition federal-state cooperative enforcement 
agreements on local officials’ willingness to follow federal statutory and 
regulatory law with respect to U certifications. The 287(g) program already 
requires federal authorities to train local partners on immigration law.133 In 
the past, the Executive Branch has terminated 287(g) contracts with locali-
ties that violated federal law.134 Since U visa rules are a part of immigration 
law, the Executive could require compliance with federal standards for U 
certifications before recognizing or renewing a 287(g) jurisdiction.  
Another similar approach would be for the Executive Branch to condi-
tion federal law-enforcement grants on compliance with federal U visa 
rules. The constitutionality of such an approach, however, is less clear. In 
general, the Executive Branch lacks authority to impose new conditions on 
federal grants that were not contemplated by Congress and clearly agreed to 
by recipient states.135 Thus, unless the particular federal grant at issue specif-
ically authorizes the Executive to implement immigration-related require-
ments, the Administration would likely lack authority to condition receipt 
of federal funds on compliance with federal U visa rules. 
On the other hand, Congress may well have the power to condition fed-
eral law enforcement grants on the willingness of state and local recipients 
to appropriately follow federal statutory and regulatory law concerning the 
                                                                                                             
forcement determines not to further investigate or prosecute at this time; participating in any requested 
interview(s) with law enforcement officers regarding the crime or the perpetrator; communicating rele-
vant information about the crime or the perpetrator to law enforcement; or providing law enforcement 
with any requested evidence related to the crime. 
133 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2) (2018). 
134 Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, ARIZ. CAPITAL TIMES 
(June 25, 2012), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25/homeland-security-revokes-287g-
immigration-check-agreements-in-arizona/. 
135 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halederman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[I]f Congress intends 
to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.”); County of Santa 
Clara v. Trump, 250 F.Supp.3d 497, 531 (2017) (holding that the executive branch does not have the 
constitutional authority to withhold funds that Congress designated for a particular purpose). 
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U visa. To be sure, the authority of Congress to use federal funding as a 
lever to compel states and cities to implement federal policies is constrained 
by the Constitution.136 Congress may authorize spending conditions only if 
they are “germane” to the grant’s underlying purposes.137 Measures designed 
to increase public safety through effective law enforcement, such as provid-
ing protection to noncitizen crime victims, would likely be germane to sev-
eral federal law enforcement grants.138 The Edward Byrne Justice Assistance 
Grant, for example, administered by the Office of Justice Programs, specifi-
cally provides that its purpose is flexible assistance for programs like “law 
enforcement, prosecution, . . . crime prevention . . . , and crime victim and 
witness initiatives.”139 These multiple goals would be directly furthered by 
better alignment of local law enforcement practices with federal U visa re-
quirements. Thus, it is likely that Congress could constitutionally impose, 
as a condition on these grants, the requirement that states adhere to federal 
standards when certifying that a noncitizen was the victim of qualifying 
criminal activity and is willing to assist any investigation or prosecution. 
A somewhat less impactful but still highly useful Executive Branch ap-
proach would be to provide federally-funded trainings regarding federal 
standards for the U visa, especially in jurisdictions where local authorities 
regularly engage in immigration enforcement. Either way, the federal gov-
ernment should help ensure that state and local officers do not impose con-
straints on U visa certifications that go beyond federal requirements. In par-
ticular, the federal government should direct or encourage agencies not to 
decline to certify simply because the criminal activity occurred long ago, or 
because the agency decides not to investigate or prosecute further. 
C. More Timely Deferred Action for U Visa Applicants 
At the agency level, USCIS could improve on the current scheme by 
providing deferred action to U applicants on a timelier basis. Currently, the 
agency does not make a conditional adjudication until the application has 
already been waiting for many years.140 As a result, the applicant remains 
                                               
136 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576 (2012). 
137 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987). 
138 See, e.g., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM, https://www.bja.gov/jag/ (“The JAG Program provides states, tribes, 
and local governments with critical funding necessary to support a range of program areas including law 
enforcement, prosecution, indigent defense, courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and 
community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation, technology improvement, 
and crime victim and witness initiatives and mental health programs and related law enforcement and 
corrections programs, including behavioral programs and crisis intervention teams.”). 
139 Id. 
140 MARIA ODOM, CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
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subject to detention or deportation for a period that extends long after the 
decision to report crime and assist police has to be made. USCIS should 
make a prima facie determination of eligibility within 6 to 12 months of the 
application’s submission, providing deferred action to those who appear to 
qualify. Deferred action provides no real immigration benefit except the 
opportunity to apply for employment authorization and a temporary, revo-
cable assurance that the person will not be deported for a temporary basis.   
For its part, ICE should revise prosecutorial discretion policies such that 
U applicants who have yet to receive deferred action are generally not a re-
moval priority, even if they are deportable on the basis of unlawful entry or 
presence. While some noncitizens who experience crime and cooperate with 
police might nevertheless remain enforcement priorities for the current 
Administration due to their own criminal history, this policy change would 
encourage noncitizen victims who are otherwise law-abiding to come for-
ward and assist law enforcement.  
D. Increasing the Annual Cap on U Visas 
Congress could ameliorate some of the problems with the current imple-
mentation of the U visa by increasing the annual statutory cap on U visas. 
As discussed in Part II, the number of available visas is far outstripped by 
the number of noncitizens who are victimized. Additionally, because the 
agency did not issue regulations for over seven years, many noncitizens 
who could have applied earlier were unable to do so. The resulting backlog 
has created a waiting list that currently will take a decade to clear. This sit-
uation leaves vulnerable noncitizens in a liminal status even after coming 
forward to the police, which works against the goals of the U visa legisla-
tion. Accordingly, Congress should substantially increase the number of 
annual U visas. A reasonable number for this revised cap would be 34,000 
per year, which is approximately the number of primary victim U applica-
tions that were filed annually in 2016 and 2017, subtracted by the number 
denied those years.141 A related statutory reform would be to provide for au-
tomatic deferred action for those whose applications are pending in the U 
visa waitlist. 
                                                                                                             
PAROLE FOR ELIGIBLE U VISA PRINCIPAL AND DERIVATIVE PETITIONERS RESIDING ABROAD (2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisomb-u-parole-recommendation-061616.pdf. 
141 USCIS, FORM I-918 DATA FY 2017, supra note 32 (showing 35,044 applications filed by immigrant 
crime victims in FY 2016 with 1,843 denied, and 36,531 applications filed in FY 2017 with 2,128 de-
nied). Note that the denials issued in each of those years would have been related to applications filed in 
earlier years, due to the backlog. Nevertheless, these figures still provide a rough-shod method of esti-
mating the approximate number of appropriate visas that should be available in this category on an an-
nual basis. To the extent there are fewer than 34,000 approvable applications filed in a given year, the 
excess visas will help clear the substantial backlog. 
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E. Alternative Route to Certification 
Finally, Congress could create an alternative federal route for certifica-
tion where an individual clearly qualifies for U visa but local law enforce-
ment officials are unwilling to sign. As other commentators point out, the T 
visa provides a useful model for such an approach.142 The T visa (enacted at 
the same time as the U visa), was designed to provide assistance to traf-
ficked immigrants and requires that the applicant “complies with any rea-
sonable request for assistance” from law enforcement, providing an excep-
tion when the survivor is a minor or is “unable to cooperate . . . due to 
physical or psychological trauma.”143 Although certifications from law en-
forcement officials are preferred, they are not required where the noncitizen 
can provide “[c]redible secondary evidence and affidavits . . . to otherwise 
establish the requirement that the applicant be a victim of a severe form of 
trafficking in persons.”144 
As with the T visa, Congress could legislate an alternate route for per-
sons to establish eligibility for the U visa. Specifically, Congress could 
amend the statute so that noncitizens who experience serious crime, report 
that crime to police, and are willing to provide necessary further assistance 
could use affidavits and credible secondary evidence to establish their eligi-
bility in circumstances where local authorities are unwilling to certify (for 
whatever reason). This reform would allow Congress’s U visa goals to be 
achieved, as applicants would still need to demonstrate that they reported 
serious crime to the police and did not refuse any reasonable requests for 
assistance, along with the requisite showing of hardship and other criteria. 
Consequently, noncitizens living in jurisdictions where police unreasonably 
refuse to sign certifications would still have an incentive to report crime.  
F. Even an Enforcement-Oriented Administration Should Want to Pursue 
These Reforms 
At first blush, it might seem that the Trump Administration would be un-
likely to take measures that improve pathways to lawful presence for more 
undocumented noncitizens. Without a doubt, this Administration is commit-
ted to vigorous enforcement of immigration laws. But the U visa is a special 
case. First, as already noted, the Administration has articulated a commit-
ment to fighting crime, and when undocumented individuals assist law en-
forcement they undoubtedly help in that effort. Second, as Amanda Frost 
                                               
142 Kagan, supra note 9, at 962. 
143 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)(T)(i). 
144 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(f). 
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recently pointed out, the U visa is a statutorily-authorized way to reduce the 
number of unauthorized persons inside the United States by bringing them 
into compliance with federal immigration law.145 Professor Frost observed 
that a variety of federal agencies already employ cooperative enforcement 
measures designed to give regulatory violators the opportunity to pursue le-
gitimate paths to compliance.146 A similar approach in the immigration con-
text for victims of crime who are willing to assist law enforcement would 
make communities safer, reduce the number of persons in the country who 
are undocumented, and allow federal enforcers to concentrate scarce re-
sources on those it deems higher priority targets. For these reasons, even a 
restrictionist-oriented administration may well wish to pursue the reforms 
we suggest. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its laudable goals of improving public safety and protecting 
noncitizens victimized by crime, the ground-level implementation of the U 
visa program has been fraught from the start. The paltry number of visas 
available each year has led to a tremendous backlog and multi-year waitlist. 
The Trump Administration’s new immigration priorities further undermine 
this scheme and are likely to have a chilling effect on noncitizens’ willing-
ness to report crimes.147 Like the U visa police certification requirement, 
President Trump’s Executive Orders have delegated tremendous discretion-
ary enforcement power to state and local law enforcement officials. The re-
invigoration of 287(g) programs and similar cooperative enforcement has 
rekindled fears of racial profiling and discrimination in local policing prac-
tices, which in turn increases the reluctance of noncitizens to report crime 
or cooperate with law enforcement.  
This essay outlined five reforms at local, state, and federal levels that 
would ameliorate these obstacles and help realize the goals behind the U vi-
sa legislation. Any of these measures would improve upon the current 
scheme. Together, they would give life to a critical program intended to 
make communities safer and provide humanitarian aid to victims. 
                                               
145 See Amanda Frost, Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32–33 
(2017). 
146 Id. at 21–26 (discussing cooperative enforcement measures undertaken by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion, and the Food and Drug Administration). 
147 See, e.g., Interior EO, supra note 12; Enforcement Improvements EO, supra note 75. 
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